Model selection is an important part of any statistical analysis, and indeed is central to the pursuit of science in general. Many authors have examined this question, from both frequentist and Bayesian perspectives, and many tools for selecting the "best model" have been suggested in the literature. This paper considers the various proposals from a Bayesian decision-theoretic perspective.
Introduction
Much of modern scientific enterprise is concerned with the question of model choice. An experimenter or researcher collects data, often in the form of measurements on many different aspects of the observed units, and wants to study how these variables affect some outcome of interest. Which measures are important to the outcome? Which aren't? Are there interactions between the variables that need to be taken into account?
Statisticians are also naturally involved in the question of model selection, and so it is should come as no surprise that many approaches have been proposed over the years for dealing with this key issue. Both frequentist and Bayesian schools have weighed in on the matter, with methods such as tests for nested models, AIC, Mallows ¡ , exhaustive search, stepwise, backward and forward selection procedures, cross-validation, Bayes Factors of various flavors (partial, intrinsic, pseudo, fractional, posterior) , BIC, Bayesian model averaging, to name some of the more popular and well-known methods. Some of these, such as stepwise selection, are algorithms for picking a "good" (or maybe useful) model; others, for example AIC, are criteria for judging the quality of a model. Given this wealth of choices, how is a statistician to decide what to do? An approach that cannot be implemented or understood by the scientific community will not gain acceptance.
This implies that at the very least we need a method that can be carried out easily and yields results that can be interpreted by scientifically and numerically literate end-users. From a statistical point of view, we want a method that is coherent and general enough to handle a wide variety of problems. Among the demands we could make on our method would be that it obeys the likelihood principle, that it has some frequentist (asymptotic) justification, and that it corresponds to a Bayesian decision problem. Naturally, not all of these desiderata can be met at once, and this paper will do little to influence the ongoing discussion of their relative
importance. An attempt to bring coherence to the field from a Bayesian decision-theoretic perspective was given by Key, Pericchi and Smith (1999) . For an entertaining and readable look at the subject of Bayesian model selection from the scientist's perspective, we recommend the article by MacKay (1992) . We aim to give a more general overview (see also Miller, 2002, for a thorough discussion of variable selection in regression).
Why Choose a Model?
Suppose there are models, indexed by ¡ . Model ¡ has parameters ¢ ¤ £ ¦ ¥ § © £ . Then the whole parameter space is
, where denotes the model. In every statistical model, estimation may be thought of as the choice of a single value of the parameter chosen (according to some criterion) to represent the distribution. Estimation has been sharply criticized, especially by Box and Tiao (1992) , because the choice of a single value may be misleading if there are several competing parameter values, distant according to some relevant metric, that are supported in some sense by the data.
Model selection can be thought of in this framework as estimation applied to the parameter . As such, it is subject to the general criticisms of Box and Tiao. There may be occasions, just as with estimation in general, in which one model so clearly dominates the others that the choice is unobjectionable, and others in which the choice is misleading. Viewed in this light, the only special issue that comes up in model choice is that generally is discrete, and usually has finite range.
Before getting into a review of methods of how to choose a model, it is therefore important to address the question of "why?" At heart we think that the reasons are pragmatic, having to do with saving computer time and analyst attention. Viewed this way, however, there is no particular reason to choose a single best model according to some criterion. Rather it makes more sense to "deselect" models that are obviously poor, maintaining a subset for further consideration. Sometimes this subset might consist of a single model, but sometimes perhaps not.
Furthermore, if it is indeed the case that model choice is driven by consideration of costs, perhaps these can be included explicitly into the process via utility functions, as suggested by Winkler (1999) . Hence we think there are good reasons to challenge the traditional formulations of this problem.
A Conceptual Framework
Consider the following general setting. Suppose that on the parameter space
there is a prior sumption that, given , the priors on ¢ " " " # ¢ % $ are independent, this implies a prior on itself is a somewhat controversial outlook, since it posits not only that a true model exists, but that the true model is one of those under consideration. However, it is a helpful stance for at least thinking through the ramifications of a Bayesian model selection procedure and the qualities we would wish to demand of it (see also Petrone, 1997; Piccinato, 1997) . 
(1)
In a full Bayesian analysis, the priors is, that is, among what set of decisions is the choice to be made? As discussed in Section 2, the traditional decision space for model choice is to choose one of the models, but we suggest there that it might be more faithful to most applied problems to consider choosing a subset of
In addition to the space of decisions, utility functions also depend, in general, on the parameter space, which here consists in full generality of an indicator of a model, and all the Key, Pericchi and Smith (1999) , for the so-called M-open perspective, in which it is desired to evaluate a set of models, none of which is believed to be true. Their approach, as mentioned previously, is decision-theoretic, taking explicit account of the utilities involved. On the other hand, they use only improper, "objective" priors, in their analyses and as such deviate from a purely Bayesian procedure (as pointed out by Bayarri, 1999) . Even this, though, is a step forward, since most model selection techniques and criteria do not include utility considerations at all, and, when they do, it is usually (although not always) on the basis of a loss that most practitioners would not believe in, namely, zero-one loss.
The Bayesian proposal is then to make the decision that maximizes expected utility, where the expectation is taken with respect to the posterior distribution of and ¢ . It is from this perspective that we wish to examine the various schemes and criteria for model selection. In particular, one question of interest is how close do the different methods come to this framework. Where possible, we connect techniques back to the general framework. However, not all methods fit easily, or at all -frequentist approaches, for example, typically cannot be evaluated from this point of view, since they lack any formulation of priors or utilities. However, as we point out in later sections, bridges between frequentist and Bayesian procedures do exist, especially in the more recent literature, and in this case it may be possible to evaluate frequentist methods from a Bayesian point of view. In a similar vein, insofar as some of the techniques are approximations, how close are these approximations to a coherent Bayesian model selection?
Variations on this perspective are possible, even from the Bayesian point of view. While some practitioners, such as Raftery, Madigan and Hoeting (1997) emphasize posterior distri-6 butions, others, such as Box, 1980; Gelfand and Dey, 1994; Laud and Ibrahim, 1995, focus instead on predictive distributions. Finally, Bernardo and Rueda (2002) explore model choice as a problem in "Bayesian hypothesis testing."
Bayesian Model Selection

Bayes Factors -Variations on a Theme
Returning to the conceptual framework from Section 3, recall equation (1) for the posterior probability of model £ ; the posterior odds for model £ is therefore
and there must be a zero-one loss on that decision. The meaning of the second requirement is that if the statistician makes the wrong decision, it doesn't matter how far off the choice is; this is contrary to the way that statisticians think about most problems. show that Bayes Factors are sufficient if and only if a zero-one loss obtains. Other losses are available and using them does not have to complicate Bayesian model selection -Lindley (1976) for example proposes conjugate utilities for exponential families, which work in much the same way as conjugate priors. Bernardo and Rueda (2002) consider certain continuous loss functions, which have the advantage of being more natural than step function losses. Clearly, using any such alternative loss or utility leads to criteria for model selection other than the usual Bayes factor. However, Bernardo and Rueda (2002) aim to achieve an "objective" analysis, and hence, deviate from the standard set down in Section 3.
Formula (2) simplifies to (Jeffreys, 1961; Good, 1950; Lindley, 1957; Shafer, 1982, among others) . As a response to this paradox, Jeffreys proposed a Cauchy form for
, with equal prior probability on both models, and a normal likelihood.
Phenomena such as the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox, the dependence of the Bayes factor on the specified priors and the difficulties of calculating and interpreting the Bayes factor at all when improper priors are put on the parameters of the models, have led some authors to seek automatic Bayesian methods for model selection. According to Berger and Pericchi (1996) , who advocate this position, automatic methods are essential because the statistician will often, at least initially, consider a wide range of models, for which it won't usually be feasible to specify all priors subjectively (on this point, see also Laud and Ibrahim, 1995) . On the other hand, as Lindley (1997) argues, impropriety (and "objective" priors, such as so-called "reference"
and "noninformative" priors are often improper) rarely occurs in practice. In this perspective, with which we agree, a parameter is more than just an abstract mathematical construct; instead, it corresponds (at least we hope it does!) to something real, and, if the statistician were to think about the reality underlying the parameter, she should always be able to describe it reasonably well using a proper distribution. As Lindley (1997) 
where
is the marginal density of the remainder of the sample, using the prior calculated from the training set. An important point is that the training set cannot increase with the sample size; rather, a minimal training sample needs to be found. For a given data set, there will be many minimal training samples (made up of different combinations of the data points); the intrinsic Bayes factor can be calculated for each one, and then an average of these, either arithmetic or geometric, is taken, yielding the arithmetic intrinsic and geometric intrinsic Bayes factor, respectively. Further modifications of these Bayes factors, such as the trimmed and median variants, are possible; see Berger and Pericchi (1996) . A version of the geometric intrinsic Bayes factor is an approximate Bayesian solution to the well-posed decision problem, from within the M-open perspective, of selecting a model, on the basis of which a terminal action will be taken (predicting a single future observation), with a particular utility attached (Key, Pericchi and Smith, 1999) .
What is intrinsic about the intrinsic Bayes factor? Berger and Pericchi (1996) give the following motivation. Suppose we have data and , the likelihood based on the training set only will approximate the likelihood based on all of the data, raised to the
where Invariance to transformations of the data is another property of fractional Bayes factors which is not always enjoyed by the intrinsic version. When the two models being compared aren't nested, the arithmetic intrinsic Bayes factor is not well-defined, because the researcher needs to determine which model is more complex. Using an encompassing model, in which both candidates are nested, doesn't always solve the problem. O'Hagan further shows that there can be difficulties with the minimal training sample -for some problems the minimal training sample requires the use of all or most of the data, in which case the intrinsic Bayes factor cannot discriminate between models.
In response to the critique by O'Hagan (1997) and another, along similar lines, by Bertolino and Racugno (1997), Berger and Pericchi (1998) advocate the use of the median intrinsic Bayes factor, which, they claim, may not be optimal for all situations, but is "a good IBF in virtually any situation, . . . " (Berger and Pericchi, 1998, p. 2) . There are two versions of the median intrinsic Bayes factor. The first is the median over training samples (instead of an arithmetic or
The second is a ratio of medians, Taking the general idea of splitting the data into a training set and a testing set to an extreme, Aitkin (1991) This method is open to a number of criticisms, not the least of which is using the data twice, once to compute the posterior (to be used as a prior) and once to calculate the Bayes factor.
Furthermore, as pointed out by Lindley (1991) in his discussion, use of the posterior Bayes
Factor can lead to paradoxes in inference. The method does not correspond to any sensible prior, nor is it a coherent Bayesian procedure (Goldstein, 1991; O'Hagan, 1991) .
Consideration of Bayes Factors also leads to two of the more common criteria used for model selection -the Bayes Information Criterion (or BIC) and the Akaike Information Criterion (or AIC). The Schwarz criterion is defined as
where § ¢ £ is the maximum likelihood estimator under model ¡ , £ is the dimension of ¢ % £ and is the sample size (Schwarz, 1978) . Minus two times this quantity is the BIC. Asymptotically, as the sample size increases,
thus the Schwarz criterion gives a rough approximation to the logarithm of the Bayes factor, without having to specify the priors Kass and Raftery, 1995 is, the approximation does not achieve the correct value of the Bayes factor. Kass and Raftery (1995) note, though, that the Schwarz criterion should, for large samples, give an indication of the evidence for or against a model.
The AIC is given by AIC¦ -2(log maximized likelihood) 2(number of parameters); as a model selection criterion, the researcher should choose the model that minimizes AIC (Akaike, 1973) . One justification for the AIC is Bayesian (Akaike, 1983) , namely, that asymptotically, comparisons based on Bayes Factors and on AIC are equivalent, if the precision of the prior is comparable to the precision of the likelihood. This requirement that the prior change with the sample size is unusual asymptotics, and furthermore is usually not the case. Rather, the data tend to provide more information than the prior. In this situation, the model which minimizes BIC¦ -2(log maximized likelihood) (log n)(number of parameters) has the highest posterior probability. As can be seen by comparing the expressions for AIC and BIC, these two criteria differ only by the coefficient multiplying the number of parameters, in other words, by how strongly they penalize large models. In general, models chosen by BIC will be more parsimonious than those chosen by AIC. The latter has been shown to overestimate the number of parameters in a model (see, for example, Geweke and Meese, 1981; Katz, 1981; Koehler and Murphree, 1988 ). It's also worth pointing out that, even though AIC has a Bayesian justification, nowhere does a prior appear in the expression for the criterion itself. Smith and Spiegelhalter (1980) 
Bayesian Model Averaging
When working with Bayes factors, the decision space involves the choice of a model, or possibly several models, which are then used for inference or prediction. If the chosen model is only one of many possibilities, the statistician runs the risk that model uncertainty will be ignored (Draper, 1995) . In this light, it makes sense to look at the panoply of models and the inferences or predictions they would give. A formal Bayesian solution to this problem, as outlined in the conceptual framework posed in the opening sections, was proposed by Leamer (1978) . Suppose there is a quantity of interest, denoted ; the posterior distribution of this quantity, given the data is
This is a weighted average of the posterior probabilities of under each model, where the weights are given by the posterior probabilities of the models in question. Raftery, Madigan and Hoeting (1997) call this approach Bayesian model averaging (Draper, 1995 , does not use this specific terminology, but advocates the same idea). As pointed out by those authors, averaging over all models increases predictive ability, compared to basing conclusions about on any of the single models under consideration; however, the process itself can be very difficult, since it often involves integrals that are hard to evaluate, and the number of terms in the sum (that is, the number of models, ) may be too large to be easily handled.
The latter problem can be tackled by using the Occam's window algorithm for Bayesian model averaging (Madigan and Raftery, 1994) . Based on two common-sense principles of model selection, namely (1) that if a model predicts the data much worse than the best model, it should be dropped from further consideration and (2) that models that predict the data less well than their nested submodels should be discarded, this algorithm often drastically reduces the number of models that need to be considered in the average. Now, the problem is one of finding the class of models to be included in the average. is rejected, so are all of its submodels. Using either an "up" or a "down" procedure to move around the space of all possible models, models are eliminated, until the set of potentially acceptable models to go into the averaging is found.
MCMC model composition (Madigan and York, 1995 
Bayesian Linear Models
Another direction of research tackles the standard variable selection problem from a Bayesian perspective. These methods, like the frequentist ones we will discuss below, aim to find one, or a few, "best" models. They differ from the frequentist techniques in that they incorporate prior information into the analysis, and only approximate the fully Bayesian solution described in our general conceptual framework. For the regression problem, Mitchell and Beauchamp (1988) propose placing "spike and slab" priors on each of the coefficients in the regression equation,
i.e. a point mass on
for each , with the rest of the prior probability spread uniformly over some defined (and large) range. In a similar vein, George and McCulloch (1993, 1997) describe a Gibbs sampling technique for "stochastic search variable selection" in regression, which selects promising subsets of variables. George and McCulloch suggest embedding the problem in a hierarchical Bayes normal mixture model, with latent variables to identify subsets.
Models with high posterior probabilities are picked out for additional study by the procedure.
The prior on 
The latent variable is equal to 1 with probability is a mixture -it has a point mass at 0 with a certain probability, and the rest of the mass is normally distributed. Instead of a "spike and slab" prior, we have a "spike and bell." Therefore, as in Mitchell and Beauchamp (1988) , a privileged position is given to the particular hypothesis that the simplest cost function is additive, with common cost for each explanatory variable, although other scenarios are possible. This is a generalization of Lindley (1968) , who considered the univariate multiple regression case. The goal is to predict a future response,
¡
; the criterion for judging predictors is quadratic loss, to which the cost function is added. Brown et al. (1999) point out that when this method omits variables, it is not because the researcher believes that the coefficients are truly zero, but rather because the omitted variables simply cost too much, relative to the benefits derived from them in terms of prediction.
Predictive Methods
The framework proposed in Section 3 looks at the posterior probability assigned to each model. Alternatively, it should be possible to look at the predictions from the various models. Now the question of interest shifts slightly, from "Which models best explain the observed data?"
to "Which models give the best predictions of future observations generated from the same process as the original data?" Ideally, we would like to compare predictions and choose the model which gives the best overall predictions of future values. However, we don't know these "future values" -if we did, we could just use them directly. Most predictive methods, then, use some sort of jackknife approach, under the assumption that future observations from the process that generated the data would be similar to those actually in the sample. That is, the data are assumed to be exchangeable. This is the idea behind the "quasi-Bayes" approach of Geisser and Eddy (1979) , a blend of Bayesian and sample-reuse ideas. For each model, compute the likelihood as the product of "predicting densities", that is, the density of the In addition, San Martini and Spezzaferri (1984) show that their criterion fits into the framework of Smith and Spiegelhalter (1980) , with a penalty term that increases as the distance between the two models (as measured by the likelihood ratio statistic) increases. Recall from Section 4.1 that Smith and Spiegelhalter (1980) 
This conditional density is a predictive density; it averages the joint density of Gelfand and Ghosh (1998) also adopt a predictive outlook to model selection, building on the observation by that Bayes factors correspond to a 0-1 loss.
Other loss functions are possible, and they base their method on the idea of evaluating models by comparing observed data to predictions. For each model, minimize the expected posterior loss over all possible predictions of replicates of the data, where the replicates are assumed to have the same distribution as the observed data; then, choose the model for which this minimum is minimized. Note that in this framework, as opposed to our general outline of the model selection process, there is no notion of one of the models being "true"; furthermore, there are no priors assigned to the models themselves.
The goal of this approach is to obtain good predictions for replicates of the observed data, Let's consider a simple example in more detail; this example is given in Gelfand and Ghosh (1998) and we repeat it here to highlight the essentials of the method, which is somewhat different in spirit than others we have considered so far. Take
represents the model relative to which calculations are carried out. For the general form of the loss described above, this becomes
For a fixed 
The first summand can be thought of as a goodness-of-fit measure (how close are the predictions to the observed data) and the second is a type of penalty term. If comes from a normal distribution, the first term is equivalent to the likelihood ratio statistic with As pointed out in Gelfand and Ghosh (1998) , this is one example where the calculation of £ § & can be explicitly made. In general, however, a combination of asymptotic expansions and Monte Carlo simulation for the evaluation of integrals will need to be employed.
Practical Issues: Elicitation and Computation
While our focus is on methods for model selection and the criteria that relate to them, we would be remiss if we did not mention the practical problems of elicitation and computation. Elicitation of expert opinion is a feasible way of obtaining proper, subjective priors to incorporate into the model averaging procedure (as well as other Bayesian model selection techniques) and is the subject of a growing literature, much of it in the last ten years or so (see, for example, Kadane, Dickey, Winkler, Smith and Peters, 1980; Dickey, Dawid and Kadane, 1986; Garthwaite and Dickey, 1992; Kadane and Wolfson, 1998; O'Hagan, 1998; Garthwaite and Al-Awadhi, 2001 ). Garthwaite and Al-Awadhi, for example, propose a method for quantifying expert opinion about multivariate normal distributions. The basic idea is to simplify the elicitation by concentrating on one type of parameter at a time, asking the expert a series of questions, for example relating to the quantiles of the predictive distributions, as recommended by Kadane and Wolfson (1998) . Regarding computation, it is worth noting that several schemes have been developed for the calculation of posterior probabilities over model spaces of varying dimension. In particular, the reversible jump approach (Green, 1995; Richardson and Green, 1997) has been gaining popularity in Bayesian circles in recent years. Chib (1995) proposes an alternative method, which is based on the computation of marginal likelihoods, and hence allows the computation of Bayes factors as well. See also Carlin and Chib (1995) and Carlin and Polson (1991) . A recent review (Han and Carlin, 2001 ) compares reversible jump, marginal likelihood, and other approaches that use proper priors, in terms of computational ease, need for preprocessing, speed and accuracy. According to Han and Carlin (2001) , ". . . all methods . . . require significant human and computer effort, and this suggests that less formal Bayesian model choice methods may offer a more realistic alternative in many cases." (pg. 1122) Combining computation and asymptotic approximations, as shown by DiCiccio, Kass, Raftery and Wasserman (1997) is also an effective way of computing Bayes Factors for model comparison. Here, too, it was found that no one method is optimal in all situations, although a simple bridge sampler (Meng and Wong, 1996; Gelman and Meng, 1998) section), models can be compared without being nested. For details on many of the methods to be considered in the rest of this section we refer readers to Miller (2002) . Taken as a whole, the frequentist techniques and criteria do not fit in to the general Bayesian framework described in Section 3, since they do not specify priors or utilities. Where connections exist we point them out.
The various stepwise procedures, in which we include also forward selection and backward elimination, are among the most popular and widespread techniques. They all provide systematic ways of searching through models, where at each stage new models are obtained by adding or deleting one variable from the models at the previous stages. While these techniques orig-inated for regression models to aid in the variable selection problem, they can also be applied in settings that extend the basic linear model, such as generalized linear models (Lawless and Singhal, 1978; Hastie and Pregibon, 1992) , contingency tables (Agresti, 1990 ) and graphical models (Whittaker, 1990) ; for these other types, residual sum of squares would be replaced by deviance or other relevant measures. We frame our discussion in the regression context, with the understanding that the search philosophy can be used in other settings as well.
With forward selection, start with the null model and, one at a time, consider variables for inclusion in the model. At the first step, include the variable that makes the biggest individual contribution, assuming that the -test for a model with that variable versus the null model is greater than a predetermined threshold. At each step the procedure continues in this way, adding in the variable that has the largest effect given the variables already in the model, if its statistic is above the cutoff. When there is no candidate variable that meets the criterion, the algorithm stops. Another option is to set in advance the size of the largest model to be considered, and stop the procedure when that point is reached (Draper and Smith, 1981) .
Backward elimination is similar, but moves in the opposite direction. That is, starting with the full model, at each step consider eliminating the variable with the least effect on the model, given that the other variables are included. Again, a predetermined threshold for dropping variables from the model decides whether or not the candidate will indeed be taken out. When no candidates for removal meet the criterion, stop.
In both forward selection and backward elimination, once a variable has been acted upon, that decision cannot be reversed. Hence, a variable that was eliminated at some point during a backward procedure, for example, will never be allowed back in to the model. This lack of flexibility is remedied in the stepwise approach to variable selection. Here, at each step each variable is considered for inclusion or elimination. Thus, a variable might be included in an early stage, but taken out later; or, a variable that was taken out of the model might be allowed back in.
While these procedures are widely used and readily available in most statistics packages, they should be used with care. Since none of the stepwise regression methods correspond to a specific criterion for choosing a model (Weisberg, 1985, p. 211 ), the selected model need not be optimal in any other sense than that it is the result of the algorithm applied to the data set.
Indeed, working on the same data set, the forward selection and backward elimination might not result in the same final model (Graybill, 1976) . Due to the way that the algorithms work, furthermore, not all models will even be looked at. The lack of a clear criterion for model choice makes it difficult to see how these procedures fit at all into our general Bayesian framework, or, indeed, into a frequentist approach, since they each involve a complex sequential testing strategy with a dynamically changing null hypothesis.
An alternative to stepwise regression is to do an exhaustive search across all models and in such a fashion to find subsets of the variables that yield a good model, according to some criterion (see below for a discussion of possible choices). These are usually used as a starting point for further study. This approach, even with advances in computing power and memory, as well as the development of algorithms that allow the user to avoid calculating most of the models (for instance, Furnival and Wilson, 1974) , is feasible mostly when the number of vari-ables is moderate. In any case, exhaustive search over all possible models is usually naivethe statistician or the scientist often has ideas about which candidate models make substantive sense.
Criteria for Subset Selection
As described above, the exhaustive search, or all possible regressions, compares models according to a specific criterion. Those models that perform well according to the chosen criterion may be considered for a more in-depth investigation. Over the years, many criteria have Using the fitted values, it is possible to obtain a "prediction" for the deleted point, which can be compared to its actual value. The difference in the two is sometimes called the deleted resid-ual. The sum of the squared deleted residuals is the predicted residual sum of squares, PRESS (Allen, 1974) . Good models will have small values of this criterion. Similar thinking drives the pseudo-Bayes method of Geisser and Eddy (1979) discussed previously. It is important to note that, at least in theory, one needs to go through the procedure on each of the models being considered, which could be a computational burden if the number of models is large.
Modern Frequentist Developments
As in the Bayesian world, refinements and innovations on frequentist procedures continue to appear (George, 2000) . New criteria, such as the risk inflation criterion (Foster and George, 1994; Donoho and Johnstone, 1994) and the covariance inflation criterion (Tibshirani and Knight, 1999) have been proposed within the last decade. Advances in computation have created new opportunities, with the now-standard cross-validation and bootstrap (Efron, 1979 (Efron, , 1982 Stone, 1974) as well as more exotic procedures such as the "little bootstrap" (Breiman, 1992) , the nonnegative garrote (Breiman, 1995) and the lasso (Tibshirani, 1996) coming into play. Foster and George (1994) note that the variable selection problem in regression is actually a two stage process -first, a "best" subset of predictors is selected, and then the coefficients of the chosen subset are calculated by least squares. The second stage proceeds as if the predictors are known to be the correct ones, rather than having been chosen. The Risk Inflation Criterion, or RIC, is defined to be the maximum possible increase in risk due to selecting the variables in the model, as opposed to knowing which the "correct" ones are. The inflation comes from comparing the risk of the fitted model to the risk of the ideal model which uses only the "right"
variables. RIC turns out to be related to other criteria we have already encountered, such as AIC, ¡ and BIC, the difference being in the penalty it imposes on the dimensionality of the model -¡£¥ ¡ , where ¡ is the dimension of the full model, using all predictors. This same penalty was arrived at by Donoho and Johnstone (1994) for a wavelet model choice problem.
More recent work by George and Foster (2000) shows that the criteria in this family correspond to a Bayesian model selection procedure under a particular class of priors. Their work provides a bridge between frequentist and Bayesian criteria. An empirical Bayes analysis results here in an adaptive dimension penalty, as opposed to the fixed penalties of AIC, BIC,
¡
, RIC and the like. Additional advantages of the empirical Bayes approach of George and Foster (2000) are that it automatically allows for shrinkage of the least squares estimates of the selected variables, and that it fits quite naturally into a model averaging framework.
The covariance inflation criterion (Tibshirani and Knight, 1999 ) has a similar motivation to the RIC. It is a criterion for model selection in prediction problems, whereby a model is chosen based on a training set of data to find the best predictor of future data. The method adjusts the training error by the average covariance of the response and the predictors, when the model is applied to permutations of the original data set.
Some of the other more recent developments in the area -the little bootstrap, the nonnegative garrote and the lasso, mentioned above, also take advantage of advances in computing power. Breiman's (1995) nonnegative garrote grows out of an attempt to keep the strengths of both subset selection and ridge regression. The advantage of the former is that it does select out variables; however, it is highly unstable, in that small changes in the data set can lead to very different models. Ridge regression, on the other hand, is very stable, but does not eliminate any variables, leading to possibly cumbersome models that are ( . This "garrote" is relatively stable, while eliminating some variables from consideration. It tends to lead to larger models than ordinary subset regression, but on the other hand it is, in many instances, more accurate (in terms of prediction). The "little bootstrap" (Breiman, 1992) or cross-validation (Stone, 1974; Efron, 1982) can be used to estimate the value of the garroting parameter, ¡ .
A similar idea is captured by Tibshirani's lasso (1996) , which chooses Tibshirani, a main difference between the lasso and the garrote is that the latter modifies the ordinary least squares estimates, and hence its behavior is, at least in part, dependent on theirs.
In contrast, with the lasso there is no explicit use of the least squares estimates. Tibshirani also offers a Bayesian interpretation of the lasso estimates, as the posterior mode under independent double-exponential priors on the s.
Conclusions
An endeavor as basic to the pursuit of science as model choice and selection is bound to generate a plethora of approaches. Bayesian and classical statisticians have both put forth proposals for solving this most difficult and interesting of problems. With such a wealth of methods, it can be difficult, as we have argued, for a researcher to know what is the "proper" way to proceed.
The unifying conceptual framework we proposed is an attempt to bring order to this often chaotic field. From this perspective, a "model" is just a discrete parameter in a larger supermodel. Model averaging, with proper priors, provides a principled and coherent Bayesian approach to the problem at hand. Regarding other Bayesian techniques, such as the various flavors of Bayes factors, while they may be solutions to specific decision theoretic problems, as described in Key, Perrichi and Smith (1999) , they are more narrow in focus and in applicability.
Indeed, applicability of the "default prior" methods, embodied in intrinsic and fractional Bayes factors, needs to be checked on a case by case basis (Berger and Perrichi, 1997) and in that sense they don't necessarily offer an advantage even over frequentist methods.
Frequentist approaches to model selection of course do not fit neatly into the proposed Bayesian framework, and suffer from the lack of a guiding principle. New methods are developed apparently on ad hoc grounds. To be fair, many of the so-called objective Bayesian techniques also seem to us to be derived more as a response to something else not working, than from proper Bayesian considerations, and this is perhaps not coincidental. Objective Bayesians try to avoid the discomfort of selecting a subjective (proper) prior, that is, they hope to "have 38 their Bayesian cake and eat it too."
